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In October  2013,  the  European  Commission  presented  a new  indicator  intended  to capture  innovation
outputs  and  outcomes  and  thereby  “support  policy-makers  in  establishing  new  or reinforced  actions
to  remove  bottlenecks  that prevent  innovators  from  translating  ideas  into  products  and  services  that
can  be  successful  on the market”.  This  article  aims  to  evaluate  the  usefulness  of the  new  indicator
against  the  background  of  the difﬁculties  in  measuring  innovation  outputs  and  outcomes.  We  develop  a
unique conceptual  framework  for measuring  innovation  outcomes  that  distinguishes  structural  change
and  structural  upgrading  as  two  key  dimensions  in both  manufacturing  and  services.  We  conclude  that
the  new  indicator  is  biased  towards  a somewhat  narrowly  deﬁned  “high-tech”  understanding  of  inno-
vation  outcomes.  We  illustrate  our  framework  proposing  a  broader  set  of  outcome  indicators  capturing
also structural  upgrading.  We  ﬁnd  that the results  for the  modiﬁed  indicator  differ  substantially  for  a
number  of countries,  with  potentially  wide-ranging  consequences  for  innovation  and  industrial  policies.
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. Introduction
In October 2013, the European Commission (EC) launched a new
ndicator (henceforth the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator) for mea-
uring the EU’s progress in meeting the goals of the Europe 2020
trategy and its Innovation Union ﬂagship initiative (European
ommission, 2013). The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is intended
o measure innovation outputs and outcomes, complementing the
eadline R&D intensity indicator (R&D expenditures as a share of
DP) used so far for policy coordination. During the 2000s, this R&D
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: juergen.janger@wifo.ac.at (J. Janger),
orben.Schubert@circle.lu.se (T. Schubert), petra.andries@ugent.be (P. Andries),
ammer@zew.de (C. Rammer), machteld.hoskens@kuleuven.be (M.  Hoskens).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.10.001
048-7333/© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.intensity indicator strongly inﬂuenced research and innovation
policy in Europe as the heads of state and government of EU mem-
ber states agreed on a 3% target for this indicator at their Barcelona
summit in 2002 (European Commission, 2002). Over time, both
policy makers and researchers recognised that the R&D intensity
indicator had certain limitations in order to serve as the main indi-
cator to monitor improvements of the EU in becoming the most
competitive knowledge-intensive society. On the one hand, indus-
try structure strongly determines R&D intensity (Mathieu and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2010; Reinstaller and Unterlass, 2012),
favouring countries with R&D-intensive industries. On the other
hand, relying only on input indicators might result in overrating
unproductive R&D investment (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia,
2015).
The European Council tried to solve these problems and asked
the EC to develop “a new indicator measuring the share of fast-
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rowing innovative companies in the economy”1; to add an output
nd outcome dimension to the input dimension already provided
y the R&D intensity indicator. In the following two years, the
ommission services experimented with different approaches to
evelop and measure such an indicator, consulting also with a
igh Level Panel on the Measurement of Innovation (2013) and
nally presented the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator. It combines
our individual indicators intended to measure innovation outputs
nd outcomes into a single composite indicator: (1) patent appli-
ations, (2) economic signiﬁcance of knowledge-intensive sectors,
3) trade performance of knowledge-intensive goods and services
nd (4) signiﬁcance of fast-growing ﬁrms in innovative sectors. The
our individual indicators are also part of the Innovation Union
coreboard (IUS, from 2016 on: European Innovation Scoreboard).
Since tools such as the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator are not only
sed as a purely informational basis but also feed into evidence-
ased policy advice, e.g. country speciﬁc recommendations within
he Europe 2020 strategy or smart specialisation initiatives, the
dequacy of the information provided becomes crucial. It is there-
ore critical to know whether the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator
easures innovation outputs and outcomes without bias. This
aper attempts to evaluate the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator
gainst this policy background. We  develop a conceptual frame-
ork of innovation outcomes at the sectoral level that distinguishes
wo types of innovation outcomes: (1) structural change towards
nowledge-intensive sectors, and (2) structural upgrading, i.e.
oving closer to the frontier2 within existing sectors.
An illustrative empirical analysis using novel indicators for
tructural upgrading reveals that the EU 2020 Innovation Indi-
ator is reasonably well reﬂecting processes of structural change
hile it does not appropriately address structural upgrading. The
ndicator therefore overrates countries specialised in knowledge-
ntensive sectors far from the frontier. With the same reasoning it
nderrates countries specialised in less-knowledge intensive sec-
ors close to the frontier. In this respect, the EU 2020 Innovation
ndicator solves only one of the two problems associated with the
&D intensity indicator. While it complements the input perspec-
ive with an outcome perspective, it also strongly focuses on the
hare of sectors classiﬁed as knowledge-intensive in the economy
nd tends to ignore actual innovation outcomes.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 develops a con-
eptual framework of innovation outcome measurement. Based on
his framework, Section 3 analyses the strengths and weaknesses
f the new EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and compares the results
f this indicator with a more comprehensive outcome indicator
hat includes structural upgrading. In Section 4 we  discuss the pol-
cy relevance of our ﬁndings and suggest ways for improving the
easurement of innovation outcomes at the country level.
. Measuring innovation outputs and outcomes at the
ountry level
.1. Innovation outputs vs. outcomes
Traditionally, most attempts to measure innovation focused
n innovation inputs, in particular R&D (see the Frascati Manual;
ECD, 2015) and human resources for innovation (see the Can-
erra Manual; OECD and Eurostat, 1995). While these approaches
ave been by and large successful in terms of delivering compa-
able international data on the input side, comparable and reliable
1 Conclusion of 4/2/2011 (Council doc. EUCO 2/1/11 REV1).
2 We use the term “frontier” broadly in this paper, indicating the highest level of
he concept of interest, such as knowledge intensity, quality, etc., referring to the
erformance of both manufacturing and services.licy 46 (2017) 30–42 31
indicators on innovation outputs and outcomes at the country-level
are still largely missing in spite of the efforts by the Oslo Manual
(OECD and Eurostat, 2005) to harmonise measurement of innova-
tion output and outcomes (see Godin, 2003, 2007; Freeman and
Soete, 2009).
A starting point to derive country-level indicators of innovation
outputs and outcomes is the literature on the innovation produc-
tion function (e.g., Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Bernstein and Singh,
2006; Godin, 2007; Roper et al., 2008; Chen and Guan, 2011). In
addition, stage process models from the evaluation literature (e.g.,
the logic chain model) try to identify critical areas of innovation
performance measurement, including wider impacts of innovation
on society and the economy (e.g. McLaughlin and Jordan, 1999).
Following this literature and the terminology of the Oslo Man-
ual, ﬁrms can transform innovation inputs (e.g. R&D, human
resources, research infrastructures and the stock of existing knowl-
edge) in a ﬁrst stage into intermediate outputs, such as patents,
often referred to as throughputs (Grupp, 1997; Frietsch and
Schmoch, 2006) and potentially,3 in a second stage, into innova-
tion outputs. They refer to the direct results of innovative efforts of
economic actors. This is typically the introduction of an innovation
on the market (product innovation, marketing innovation) or in
the economic actor’s operation (process innovation, organisational
innovation). Typical measures of innovation output are counts of
product and process innovations (see Geroski, 1994) or the share
of ﬁrms that have introduced innovations.
Innovation outcomes are the consequences of the introduction of
innovations, among them the economic effects of innovation out-
puts on the ﬁrms introducing them. Introducing an innovation and
even less so applying for a patent does not automatically have eco-
nomic effects. A product innovation, for example, needs to be sold
to users, and a process innovation must lead to signiﬁcant changes
in cost or other production related inputs in order to generate eco-
nomic effects. Linked to these potential ﬁrm-level outcomes are
economy-wide outcomes, also called impacts, resulting from the
diffusion of an innovation from the ﬁrm and sector where the inno-
vation originated onto other industries and ﬁnally the economy as
a whole (see the seminal work by Rogers, 2003, on the diffusion of
innovations). These outcomes also include non-economic ones, e.g.
health beneﬁts of new medical equipment. In the present paper, we
refer to the economic consequences of all four types of innovation
output identiﬁed by the Oslo Manual (product, process, market-
ing, organisational), in line with the scope of the EU Innovation
Indicator.
While the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is a systematic attempt
to provide internationally comparable data on the output and out-
come dimension of innovation, it has important limitations. First,
while the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator tries to address innova-
tion outputs, it does so only based on patent data which reﬂect
the output of R&D processes but should, for several reasons dis-
cussed below, not be equated with innovation output. Second, we
will argue that the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator adopts a “high-
tech” view on innovation because the three indicators relating to
innovation outcomes (signiﬁcance of knowledge-intensive sectors,
the competitiveness of knowledge-intensive goods and services,
and the signiﬁcance of fast-growing ﬁrms in innovative sectors)
mainly attempt to measure structural change of economic activ-
ity towards predeﬁned sectors with high knowledge intensity. The
sole focus on such sectors, however, neglects innovation outcomes
of ﬁrms in less-knowledge-intensive sectors that may  lead to an
upgrading of such sectors and may  improve economy-wide perfor-
mance substantially. It also neglects actual innovation outcomes in
3 Not all patents are used for the introduction of innovations (Section 3.1).
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nowledge-intensive sectors as we don’t know, e.g., whether fast-
rowing ﬁrms in these sectors achieved their growth because of
nnovation.
.2. Innovation outcomes: structural change vs. upgrading
Economic effects of innovation have often been related to the
egree of novelty of innovations, with scholars distinguishing
etween “radical” innovations, describing completely new goods
nd services or production processes, and “incremental” innova-
ions, relating to performance improvements of existing goods
nd services or production processes which do not fundamen-
ally alter their characteristics (e.g., Dosi, 1982; Freeman and Soete,
997). More radical innovation may  lead to higher productivity
nd growth effects as a higher degree of novelty can potentially
llow for a more substantial change in production methods or
erformance characteristics of new goods and services. Radical
nnovation may  also mobilise new demand by offering entirely
ew applications. If radical innovations indeed generated superior
conomic effects, the measurement of innovation outcomes would
eed to focus on capturing the degree of novelty of innovations
hich is difﬁcult. Quantifying the radicalness of innovation—or its
egree of novelty—remains a substantial challenge for empirical
esearch.4
Interestingly, Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) argued that radical
echnical changes do not necessarily lead to radical innovations in
erms of how product features change. For example, the change
rom propeller to jet aircraft technology provided only incremen-
al service improvements in terms of faster travel times while
ncremental technical changes can lead to radical innovations in
erms of the services they provide to users, such as the Smartphone
Vogelstein, 2013).5 In terms of innovation outcomes, incremental
nnovations may  hence be as important as radical ones. A large
ariety of literature provides support for this view. While the focus
f the early innovation literature was clearly devoted to radical
nnovations (Schumpeter, 1961; compare also Smith, 2005), the
mportance and frequent occurrence of incremental innovations
as inter alia been outlined by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and
undvall (2010), not least because they mirror trends in both com-
etition strategy and growing complexity of knowledge bases.
First, in countries close to the frontier, innovation is the dom-
nant business strategy for many ﬁrms, and innovation processes
ecome routine elements of ﬁrm activities (Hölzl and Janger, 2014).
ncreasing competitive pressure by low-cost ﬁrms may  lead to
pgrading of existing products and processes (Bloom et al., 2016).
n many mature industries, radical innovation by incumbents could
ndanger their return on large sunk investments, with successful
nnovations mainly replacing the incumbent’s old proﬁt position
4 Efforts include (a) “the objective approach”, technometrics or literature-based
easures of novelty, which are based on information from technical and trade jour-
als (Grupp, 1994; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1993; Coombs et al., 1996), and (b) “the
ubjective approach”, surveying ﬁrms about novelty as outlined in the Oslo Manual
nd applied in the Community Innovation Surveys. The Oslo Manual sets a threshold
evel  for a change to count as an innovation by referring to the concept of “signiﬁcant
mprovement”. Beyond that, it distinguishes between innovations which are “new
o  the ﬁrm”, “new to the market” and “new to the world”. While the ﬁrst approach
s  cumbersome and barely works for services, the second is a subjective assessment
hich has been shown to vary with the level of development of countries or markets
see Knell and Srholec, 2009).
5 Radical and incremental changes can also be intertwined. The accumulation of
ncremental improvements over time may  eventually constitute a radical (techno-
ogical) innovation (e.g. as in the case of spark generators, the weight of which was
educed from 118 kg to 2 kg over a span of 30 years), while subsequent incremental
technical) innovations may  be necessary for a preceding radical (technical) inno-
ation to create radical new service characteristics (e.g., as in the case of Teﬂon; see
line and Rosenberg, 1986).licy 46 (2017) 30–42
(Arrow, 1962; Reinganum 1983), so that moving forward by small
steps may  be the rational competitive strategy.
Second, the growing complexity of knowledge leads to an
increasing specialisation of ﬁrms on core competencies, in turn con-
tributing to increased path-dependency of technological progress
at the ﬁrm level. Firms usually learn along their cumulative knowl-
edge bases, guided by ﬁrm-speciﬁc routines (see Dosi and Nelson,
2010; for a recent survey), and this results rather in incremental
than radical innovation (Pavitt, 2005).6
A focus on the measurement of the economic effects of radi-
cal vs. incremental innovations may  hence be of limited relevance.
Therefore, we  conclude that capturing innovation outcomes at the
ﬁrm level according to novelty should not be a main requirement
for indicators measuring such outcomes. Instead, we see more
potential for identifying and measuring innovation outcomes at the
industry level. Dosi (1988) calls the economic effect of innovations
an asymmetry-creating effect which will improve the competitive
position of a ﬁrm, e.g. through lower prices or better goods and
services. Dosi (1988) notes as a result that industrial structure is
endogenous to innovative activity, i.e. that outcomes of innovation
are reﬂected in changes of industry structure. From a measurement
perspective, we  propose that there are two  possible ways for inno-
vation outputs to show up in outcomes at the sector level of both
manufacturing and services, i.e. as economic beneﬁts of innovation.
The ﬁrst, which we call structural change, reﬂects a differential
growth of value added across industries, away from industries with
lower levels of knowledge intensity to industries with higher inten-
sity. By such a change, the share of output in knowledge-intensive
industries in an economy’s total output will increase.
The second, which we  call structural upgrading, features
differential performance of ﬁrms within industries without nec-
essarily changing the overall composition of economic activities.
This differential performance may  be reﬂected in moving to more
knowledge-intensive activities within a sector, thereby preserv-
ing or reinforcing existing competitive advantages. Dosi (1988)
has conceptualised this intra-sectoral movement of ﬁrms through
innovation in terms of changing distances to the frontier at the
ﬁrm level. Such upgrading may  not necessarily be reﬂected in dif-
ferential value added growth at the ﬁrm level. Instead, its economic
beneﬁt may  consist in increasing the quality of goods and services
to be able to hold market shares and prices constant when con-
fronted with low-cost competition or in keeping costs down to stay
competitive in spite of higher wages paid to a ﬁrm’s workforce.
A simple conceptual model can illustrate both channels (see
Fig. 1). The model starts with innovation outcomes at the ﬁrm level,
which result from the characteristics of innovation outputs.7 On
the one hand, changes to existing processes can decrease a ﬁrm’s
production costs. This either allows to reduce costs relative to com-
peting ﬁrms or to keep them constant relative to competitors that
are also trying to reduce costs. Depending on the amount of rel-
ative cost reduction and the ensuing price setting, value added
and market shares generated by a ﬁrm’s goods and services may
remain unchanged or may  increase.8 On the other hand, innova-
6 “It is precisely the paradigmatic cumulative nature of technological knowledge
that accounts for the relatively ordered nature of the observed patterns of tech-
nological change. . . [] technological search processes in each ﬁrm are cumulative
processes too. What the ﬁrm can hope to do technologically in the future is nar-
rowly constrained by what it has been capable of doing in the past” (Dosi, 1988; p.
1129f).
7 For brevity, we only mention product and process innovation, but the model
works equally for marketing and organisational innovation.
8 “Whenever at any time a given quantity of output costs less to produce than
the same or a smaller quantity did cost or would have cost before, we  may be
sure, if prices of factors have not fallen, that there has been innovation somewhere”
(Schumpeter, 1939; p. 89)), as cited by Godin (2007, p. 1390).
J. Janger et al. / Research Policy 46 (2017) 30–42 33
 and the industry level: a conceptual model.
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ions can also change existing product quality, keep product quality
nchanged relative to competitors or increase it, with impacts on
alue added or market shares as a function of corresponding price
etting. In addition, a new successful product can increase value
dded (net of any substitution effects with the older product).
These outcomes of innovations at the ﬁrm level translate either
nto economic effects of innovation changing the sector compo-
ition of activities (structural change through higher value added
rowth of industries characterised by high knowledge intensity rel-
tive to industries showing lower knowledge intensities) or change
he intra-sectoral composition of activities by moving towards seg-
ents of higher knowledge intensity within the same industry
structural upgrading).
Both outcomes, structural change and upgrading, are shown
chematically in Fig. 2. Industries from either manufacturing or
ervices are roughly classiﬁed in four broad groups by knowl-
dge intensity. The circle for each group represents its average
nowledge intensity, going from low intensity, on the right, to
igh intensity, on the left. Within each of the groupings, ﬁrms can
e more or less knowledge-intensive, or display varying distances
o the frontier in each grouping, sliding up or down the vertical
xis. Structural upgrading (SU) then occurs when ﬁrms (and con-
equently industries composed of those ﬁrms in a country) move
pward on the vertical axis. Structural change (SC) occurs when
here is a horizontal move, from industries with lower levels of
nowledge intensity, towards industries with higher knowledge
ntensity.
While radical innovations may  be more likely than incremen-
al innovations to trigger structural change, Fig. 1 and 2 show that
tructural change can well be the result of incrementally improv-
ng products and processes, e.g. when the ﬁrm is already active
n a very knowledge-intensive industry (e.g., iterations of the lat-
st Smartphones). On the other hand, a radically new product in
 less knowledge-intensive sector may  merely prevent the decline
f the industry (see, e.g. the development of breathable and water-
roof textiles). Put differently, developments along a technological
rajectory may  not just lead to structural upgrading, but also toFig. 2. Schematic display of structural change and upgrading.
structural change at the industry level, while a new technological
paradigm may  not necessarily initiate structural change towards
more knowledge-intensive industries.
Policymakers often focus on increasing the share of knowledge-
intensive goods and services in the economy (structural change), as
evidenced by what some call the competitiveness-induced “obses-
sion” with “high-technology” goods and services (see Godin, 2004).
Empirical evidence however shows that structural upgrading as
an outcome of innovation is equally relevant for economic per-
formance. Kline and Rosenberg (1986) point to the example of
the US electric power generation industry which achieved high
rates of productivity growth without introducing any single major
innovation but by constantly upgrading in the form of slow, cumu-
lative improvements in the efﬁciency of centralised thermal power
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lants.9 Robertson et al. (2009) observe that the development
f both higher-quality products and new products can offset the
aturation of older industries, limiting declines in demand for
oods and services of low knowledge-intensity sectors. A ﬁrm-level
nalysis of the global paper industry by Ghosal and Nair-Reichert
2009) ﬁnds that the impact of investments in modernisation
uilds up over time to create signiﬁcant performance differences
ith respect to ﬁrms’ productivity and competitive position. The
mpirical literature agrees that innovation outputs signiﬁcantly
nﬂuence economic performance in all industries, including less
nowledge-intensive ones, either through product differentiation
r cost reduction (Peneder, 2010; Kirner et al., 2009).
Also the international trade literature provides evidence on the
mportance of structural upgrading. In Grossman and Helpman’s
1991) North-South trade model, every traded product is posi-
ioned on a “quality ladder”. Its production will move to the ‘South’
nce the ‘South’ is able to imitate its technology. As a result,
rms from the ‘North’ are forced to innovate and bring out the
ext generation of higher quality products in order to escape
ow cost competition. The empirical trade literature conﬁrms this
ffect as advanced countries try to cope with the adjustment
ressure from rising emerging economies (see, e.g., Schott, 2008;
artin and Mejean, 2014). Bloom et al. (2016) show that Chinese
mport competition led to two distinct effects among European
rms. A “within”-effect increases productivity at the ﬁrm level
nd a “between”-effect reallocates employment towards more
nnovative and technologically advanced ﬁrms. In summary, the
vailable evidence points to the fact that both structural change and
pgrading at the industry level are important types of innovation
utcomes.
.3. Measuring structural change and structural upgrading
The measurement of outcomes of innovation at the industry
evel has several beneﬁts in comparison to measuring outputs or
utcomes at the ﬁrm level. One is that spillover effects can be cap-
ured, i.e. the spread of beneﬁts from the innovating ﬁrm to other
rms, possibly located in different industries. A general frame-
ork of structural change and upgrading is in principle able to
apture innovation outcomes wherever they originated, in both
anufacturing and services and irrespective of the type of inno-
ation (product, process, marketing or organisational). Measuring
utcomes rather than outputs also alleviates the problems related
o identifying an innovation’s degree of novelty. Eventually, from
n economic perspective, the degree of novelty of an individual
nnovation – be it related to technological or service characteristics
 matters less than the economic beneﬁts of this innovation.
There are a variety of indicators to measure the extent of
tructural change towards sectors with higher knowledge, R&D or
nnovation intensity (e.g., Peneder, 2010; Hatzichronoglou, 1997;
nd Godin, 2004, for a survey). The most common approach is to
alculate an international average of knowledge intensity for each
ector and then determine the shares of knowledge-intensive sec-
ors in national output. The fragmentation of international value
hains particularly in manufacturing may  however produce mis-
eading results (Janger et al., 2011). As the knowledge intensity of
ndustries is calculated on international averages rather than on
ountry-speciﬁc data, a country can have high shares in knowledge-
ntensive sectors even when it hosts only less knowledge-intensive
arts of the value chain, such as ﬁnal assembly (an example being
9 “. . . it is a serious mistake (increasingly common in societies that have a growing
reoccupation with high technology industries) to equate economically important
nnovations with that subset associated with sophisticated technologies” (Kline and
osenberg, 1986; p. 278).licy 46 (2017) 30–42
Hungary; see also Srholec, 2007). The fragmentation of the value
chains then penalises countries specialised in the high quality or
knowledge-intensive segments of less knowledge-intensive sec-
tors (e.g., Austria and Italy).
Upgrading indicators can correct for this bias by showing a
country’s position in different knowledge intensity or quality seg-
ments within industries, but they are more difﬁcult to build. So
far, the most commonly used survey-based indicator which could
be regarded as an indicator for structural upgrading is the sales
share of product innovations (when weighted by industries’ shares
in total output). This indicator has been used both in analyses of
sector and country innovation performance (particularly by the
Innovation Union Scoreboard, see European Commission, 2014)
and in ﬁrm-level studies of innovation performance (Mairesse and
Mohnen, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat,
2010; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). Interestingly, the EU 2020
Innovation Indicator refrained from adopting this indicator for
measuring innovation output, presumably due to reservations
about its reliability: while the sales share of product innovations
is useful to quantify the outcome of a ﬁrm’s (product) innovation
efforts, comparability across ﬁrms, sectors and countries is limited
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Knell and Srholec, 2009; Rammer et al.,
2009). First, perceptions by ﬁrms of what constitutes an innova-
tion and how novel it is may  differ. While ﬁrms from countries at
the frontier of technological change and innovation are likely to
apply higher standards for changes to products in order to qualify
as innovations, ﬁrms from catching-up countries may  regard the
adoption of a standard product as an innovation if that product
has not been offered on their market yet. In addition, the concept
of new-to-market innovations, which is frequently surveyed as a
qualiﬁer of product innovation,10 is also a problematic one since
ﬁrms may  refer to very different geographic and sectoral markets
when reporting market novelties. Second, comparison between
industries is complicated by the fact that the sales share of new
products is strongly driven by product life time. For this reason, the
ﬁrst and second edition of the Oslo Manual suggested collecting
data on the average or typical length of the product life in order
to control for this interference, but only a few innovation surveys
implemented this idea. Potentially related to life-cycle aspects, but
also to changing perceptions of innovativeness and technical survey
issues such as sampling, the indicator is also quite volatile.
Janger et al. (2011) suggest two outcome indicators on struc-
tural upgrading that are not based on ﬁrm survey data: one
measuring “export quality”, i.e. the share of low-, medium- and
high-quality exports of an industry (manufacturing only), and the
other measuring R&D intensity of countries by correcting for indus-
trial structure of both manufacturing and services. The ﬁrst is
now becoming more commonplace in different methodologies (e.g.
Vandenbussche, 2014). “Export quality” is measured by unit val-
ues of exports (price per unit of weight). This proxy has certain
shortcomings (see Aiginger, 1997; for a discussion). But all in all,
higher shares in the higher quality segment should indicate innova-
tion outcomes or commercial success of innovations, as innovations
change the competitiveness of goods through changes of cost and
quality, as outlined in Section 2.2. The second indicator, R&D inten-
sity of a country’s business sector corrected for industrial structure,
is not per se an outcome indicator. However, knowing whether
a country—relative to an average of R&D intensive benchmark
countries—is R&D intensive or not given its industrial structure,
allows for an assessment of its position on the segments of an
industry in terms of its knowledge intensity. This indicator can
10 Innovation surveys of the cis-type usually collect information on the introduc-
tion of product innovations, followed by separate questions on the degree of novelty,
using new-to-market vs. only new-to-ﬁrm as the main novelty dimension.
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lso be used as a weighting scheme for structural change indicators
Reinstaller and Unterlass, 2012), adding an outcome dimension. As
uch, it could serve as a proxy for an outcome indicator when used
n conjunction with structural change indicators. Both indicators
mpirically perform well in explaining performance differences
etween countries, complementing the information obtained from
tructural change indicators.
In the following section, we will discuss the new EU 2020 Inno-
ation Indicator against the background of our framework. As a
akeaway, lack of differentiation between radical and incremental
nnovation should not overly matter if one is more interested in
he economic effects of innovation, but any indicator trying to cap-
ure outcomes should integrate dimensions of structural change
nd upgrading. We  will now continue with presenting the EU 2020
nnovation Indicator in more detail and assessing to which extent
ts measurement approach takes into account the conceptual con-
ideration presented in this section.
. Assessment of the EU 2020 innovation indicator and a
roposal for a modiﬁed indicator
.1. The EU 2020 innovation indicator
The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator is a composite indicator that
onsists of four components intended to measure different aspects
f innovation outputs and outcomes: patent applications, economic
igniﬁcance of knowledge-intensive sectors, trade performance
f knowledge-intensive goods and services, and employment in
ast-growing ﬁrms in innovative sectors. These indicators have
een proposed by a High Level Panel on the Measurement of
nnovation (2013). A ﬁfth indicator recommended by the High Level
anel—labour productivity—has not been included in the EU 2020
nnovation Indicator, mainly because of a perceived too weak link
etween productivity and innovation outcome. A detailed descrip-
ion of each indicator and technical details on how the composite
ndicator is calculated can be found in Vértesy and Tarantola (2014).
n the following, we assess the four components of the indicator
ith respect to the types of innovation output and outcome they
epresent.
The ﬁrst component is the number of PCT patent applications11
er billion GDP (PCT). It has become very common in large parts of
he innovation literature to use patents as proxy for innovation out-
ut (among many others see Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Crépon et al.,
998; Bronzini and Piselli, 2016), partly because of the broad inter-
ational availability of patent data. Nonetheless, treating patents
s innovation outputs is conceptually problematic. In fact, already
n their foundational paper, Griliches and Pakes (1980) were very
xplicit that patents are proxies for knowledge and thus often
losely linked to knowledge generating processes such as R&D.
et, they need not be very informative about innovation output
or many reasons.
For example, patents may  not lead to actually implemented
nnovations as they may  merely be used to impede innovations
y competitors (Blind et al., 2006; Moser, 2013; Hall and Ziedonis,
001). As a consequence, patent counts can overestimate innova-
ion output, because patented technologies are not always brought
nto use. At the same time, large parts of innovation outputs are
ot patentable at all, leading to potential downward biases when
easuring innovation output by patents only (Arundel and Kabla,
998). Several authors show that downward biases are particularly
trong in sectors with low propensities to patent, such as services
11 Applications ﬁled under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) which name the
uropean Patent Ofﬁce as designated ofﬁce in the international phase of the appli-
ation procedure.licy 46 (2017) 30–42 35
(Scherer, 1983; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Brouwer and Kleinknecht,
1999).
The choice of measuring innovation outputs via patent data
therefore implies conceptual problems. In particular, patents reﬂect
knowledge related throughputs rather than innovation output. In
our context of measuring innovation outcomes, patents are also
likely to entail further measurement problems because patenting
propensities differ considerably by sector, with high propensi-
ties found in particular in high-technology manufacturing. Using
patents therefore reinforces a bias towards technology-driven sec-
tors. Beyond this general bias, the patent component of the EU 2020
Innovation Indicator induces a further bias, because it reﬂects the
development of inventions to be used on global markets by focusing
on PCT patents. In many industries, and particularly in SMEs, inno-
vations are not targeted towards global but rather to national or
regional markets. As a result, ﬁrms often seek patent protection at
national patent ofﬁces and do not go through a costly PCT applica-
tion process. The current PCT component of the EU 2020 Innovation
Indicator hence does not capture innovation throughputs targeted
at these national or regional markets.
The second component measures the share of employees in
knowledge-intensive industries in total business enterprise sector
employment (KIA). Knowledge-intensity of industries is measured
for Europe as a whole rather than based on country-speciﬁc data,
using one third of employees having a higher education degree
as a threshold. As a result, countries can only improve their score
on this indicator by employing more people in a pre-speciﬁed set
of knowledge-intensive industries. Increased employment in sec-
tors that are not regarded as knowledge-intensive will lead to a
decreased score even if this increased employment is due to signif-
icant investments in innovation.
The third component should represent the competitiveness of
knowledge-intensive goods and services by evaluating trade per-
formance (COMP). It consists of two  sub-components, the share of
medium-high and high-tech goods in total exports (GOOD) and the
share of knowledge-intensive services in the total service exports
(SERV), again applying the same deﬁnition of medium-high and
high-tech goods and knowledge-intensive services for all coun-
tries. Both components receive equal weights to calculate a single
indicator. This implies that a country’s specialisation on either
services or manufacturing is not considered. Moreover, as with
the indicators on the employment share in knowledge-intensive
sectors, the innovativeness of exports is determined through inter-
national averaging, so that it is not known for a speciﬁc country
how knowledge-intensive the goods and services in question really
are. For example, high-tech goods are identiﬁed through interna-
tional classiﬁcations, rather than through real information on the
knowledge content of country exports. Note that countries with
a high share of tourism services exports will also be penalised,
as any knowledge-intensive services will get a comparably lower
score, even if e.g. the share of knowledge-intensive services in GDP
between two countries was the same.
The fourth component should represent dynamism and reﬂects
the employment in fast-growing ﬁrms from innovative sectors
(DYN). Three types of information are combined: the innovative-
ness of a sector, the knowledge intensity of that sector, and the
number of employees in fast-growing ﬁrms in that sector as a
percentage of total sector employment. Both innovativeness and
knowledge intensity of sectors are measured at the European level.
Fast-growing ﬁrms are ﬁrms with ten or more employees and an
average employee growth of 10% per year over three years. Again,
countries can only improve their score on this indicator through
fast-growing ﬁrms in sectors that are, on average across coun-
tries, highly innovative. This is the case even if the local ﬁrms in
that sector are not at all innovative. Similarly, highly innovative,
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burg and the Czech Republic which are above Italy in the EU 2020
Innovation Indicator. Some top performers such as Denmark and
Sweden are good in all indicators, suggesting that they are both6 J. Janger et al. / Resea
ast-growing ﬁrms in sectors which are on average in the EU less
nnovative will not lead to a higher score.
Three components (KIA, COMP, DYN) reward countries that
eallocate resources to a pre-speciﬁed set of knowledge-intensive,
nnovative sectors which are the same for all European mem-
er states. As such, these components are indicators of structural
hange, i.e. of the reallocation of economic activities away from
ndustries with lower levels of knowledge intensity to industries
ith higher knowledge intensity. They fail to capture path depen-
ent evolutions and structural upgrading in sectors that are on
verage less innovative and less knowledge-intensive, but that may
e crucial for the economic development of a country or region.
hey also fail to spot country differences in actual innovation out-
omes of sectors classiﬁed as knowledge-intensive.
This measurement approach is not in line with the European
ommission’s new policy concept of “smart specialisation”, the goal
f which is to boost regional innovation and economic growth by
nabling regions or countries to focus on their relative strengths.
 smart specialisation reasoning argues that a region or country
a) should not spread its scarce resources over a too wide range
f activities, and (b) should diversify not by focusing on the same
popular’ activities as other countries (cf. the vast number of regions
ttempting to become world class biotech players), but by instead
uilding on its own relative strengths. The three last components
f the EU 2020 innovation indicator fail to capture such specialisa-
ion efforts in established sectors, inciting all regions and countries
o reallocate their resources and activities to the exact same set
f sectors. We can conclude that the four components of the EU
020 indicator provide a rather limited coverage of the range of
nnovation outputs and outcomes discussed in Section 2.
As an empirical illustration of the issues arising from focus-
ng on structural change, Table 1 shows countries’ shares of value
dded in knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries12 and of
mployment in knowledge-intensive activities (KIA) as deﬁned
bove (including both manufacturing and services) along with the
U 2020 Innovation Indicator rank and GDP per capita. We  show
wo different industry classiﬁcations because some countries such
s Luxembourg, the UK and Cyprus achieve very high shares in
IA mainly due to a (less R&D intensive) large ﬁnancial services
ector (also contributing to their SERV score), whereas other coun-
ries such as Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic achieve
elatively large shares of R&D intensive technology-driven manu-
acturing industries due to their integration in global value chains of
nnovation-intensive industries such as automobiles (affecting also
heir DYN and GOOD scores).13 Comparison with the EU innovation
ndicator rank and GDP per capita leads to a couple of observations:
 Some countries with relatively large shares of knowledge-
intensive sectors (e.g., catching up countries such as Hungary,
Slovakia, Czech Republic, in technology-driven manufacturing,
but also advanced countries such as the UK, in education-
intensive sectors) achieve relatively high innovation scores
compared with their level of GDP per capita.
 Some countries with relatively lower shares of knowledge-
intensive sectors achieve better GDP per capita compared with
12 We use an updated version of the classiﬁcation developed by Peneder (2002)
hich is based on a cluster analysis of economic variables (labour intensity, capital
ntensity, advertising sales ratio, R&D sales ratio) obtained from the US manufac-
uring industry in the period 1990–1995. “Technology oriented” manufacturing
ndustries include chemicals and biotechnology; new information and communica-
ion technologies; and vehicles for transport. We  obtain similar results when using
he  OECD’s high-tech classiﬁcation (Hatzichronoglou, 1997).
13 R&D intensity in ﬁnancial services in the UK was 0.3% in 2013, compared with
.4% in total manufacturing, based on OECD MSTI data.licy 46 (2017) 30–42
their scores (e.g., Spain, Italy, Portugal, but also the Netherlands
and Austria, in particular in technology-driven manufacturing).
High shares of knowledge-intensive sectors have been shown
to be associated with GDP levels and growth (e.g., Peneder, 2003),
so policy-wise the second group of countries should clearly be very
worried. Given that markets are open and globally competitive, one
wonders how these countries achieve their GDP performance given
their low average innovation scores and relatively high wages. We
suspect that in some instances, the ﬁrst group of countries may
not be at the top end of quality ladders (with the exception pos-
sibly of countries beneﬁtting from large ﬁnancial services sectors),
or further away from the frontier in knowledge-intensive sectors,
while in the second group, countries are closer to the frontier in
less knowledge-intensive sectors.
3.2. A modiﬁed version of the EU 2020 innovation indicator
In the preceding sections we argued that the EU 2020 Innovation
Indicator has a strong focus on structural change as a mechanism
for promoting innovativeness at the country level, while it neglects
structural upgrading. In order to illustrate our framework, we  com-
pare the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator with an indicator, called
the SU indicator in what follows. Out of the three indicators of
structural upgrading we  outlined in Section 2.3 we  chose (1) the
export quality and (2) the sector-adjusted R&D intensity.14 We  then
present the results for a modiﬁed EU 2020 Innovation Indicator
which is calculated as the arithmetic average of the four indica-
tors used in the EU 2020 indicator and the two indicators of the
SU indicator.15 If our arguments are valid, we should observe that
countries with a focus on sectors classiﬁed through international
averaging as knowledge-intensive perform better in the EU 2020
Innovation Indicator than in the modiﬁed version when they are
further away from the frontier in these sectors.
Table 2 shows the country values for the two  upgrading indi-
cators outlined in Section 2.3,16 next to the four components of
the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator. We  see that some countries
with relatively high or close to average shares of knowledge-
intensive sectors show very negative values in the indicator for
sector-adjusted R&D intensity, implying that they are active in
the less knowledge intensive segments of these activities, possi-
bly focusing on product assembly (e.g. Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovakia or Malta).17 Some countries with relatively lower shares
of knowledge-intensive sectors show less negative adjusted R&D
intensity (e.g., Portugal, Spain, Italy) than the group above, oth-
ers even very positive values, implying specialisation in the top
R&D-intensive segment of less knowledge-intensive sectors (e.g.,
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands). In export quality as well, countries
such as Italy achieve a higher value than countries such as Luxem-14 More details on how the two structural upgrading indicators are calculated are
given in the annex following the paper.
15 As the focus of the current paper is more conceptual, we  will not go into the issue
of  weights used in composite indicators, and will use one of the simpler weighting
methods. The problem of weights used in composite indicators has been discussed
elsewhere (e.g., Grupp and Schubert, 2010).
16 It should be noted that some data problems are present in our analyses. In small
countries, small export volumes reduce the robustness of export quality data (e.g.,
Cyprus, Malta). For Ireland and Croatia, sector-adjusted R&D data are not available.
We  are very grateful to the authors of the cited papers for providing us with the
data, in particular Irene Langer, Susanne Sieber and Fabian Unterlass.
17 We refer again to the two taxonomies used in Table 1, “KIA” and the technology-
driven manufacturing sectors.
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Table  1
Sectoral specialisation in knowledge-intensive industries, EU 2020 Innovation Indicator rank and GDP per capita, sorted by GDP per capita, 2012.
Employment share of education
intensive sectors in total economy
(KIA), in %
Value added share of
technology-driven industries in
manufacturing, in %
EU 2020 Innovation Indicator
Rank
GDP per capita in PPS
(EU28 = 100)
Luxemburg 25.4 1.0 4 264
Netherlands 15.2 13.4 10 133
Ireland 20.1 56.9 3 130
Austria 14.2 13.8 9 129
Sweden 17.6 21.7 2 126
Denmark 15.5 25.7 6 125
Germany 15.8 24.9 1 123
Belgium 15.2 20.4 11 120
Finland 15.5 7.1 5 116
UK  17.8 22.6 7 107
France 14.3 22.6 8 107
Italy  13.2 13.2 17 101
EU28  13.9 20.0 100
Cyprus 16.9 7.5 18 94
Spain  11.9 13.5 21 94
Malta 17.0 0.0 16 85
Slovenia 14.1 16.2 14 82
Czech Republic 12.5 15.4 13 82
Portugal 9.0 7.5 24 76
Greece 12.3 5.9 23 74
Slovakia 10.1 15.2 15 74
Estonia 10.8 4.8 19 71
Lithuania 9.1 3.3 28 69
Poland 9.7 9.4 20 66
Hungary 12.5 23.8 12 65
Croatia 10.4 8.7 25 61
Latvia 10.3 0.9 27 60
Romania 6.5 6.4 22 53
Bulgaria 8.3 6.6 26 45
Source: Eurostat, European Commission.
Table 2
Original values for the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator and the SU indicator, 2012.
PCT KIA COMP DYN Sector-adjustedR&D intensity Export quality
EU28 4.0 13.9 5.8 17.9 −0.13 72.6
Austria 5.4 14.2 5.1 17.2 0.48 75.4
Belgium 4.0 15.2 5.1 15.6 0.30 67.9
Bulgaria 0.4 8.3 3.4 16.2 −0.72 42.7
Croatia 0.8 10.4 3.5 15.0 54.2
Cyprus 0.3 16.9 4.5 16.7 −0.52 70.0
Czech Republic 0.7 12.5 5.6 18.7 −1.05 63.6
Denmark 6.6 15.5 6.2 18.5 0.84 76.9
Estonia 2.3 10.8 4.8 14.7 0.36 56.1
Finland 10.5 15.5 4.9 17.1 1.42 70.4
France 4.2 14.3 5.6 20.8 0.43 79.0
Germany 7.8 15.8 6.9 19.1 0.00 84.1
Greece 0.4 12.3 4.2 16.8 −0.43 38.3
Hungary 1.5 12.5 5.5 19.1 −1.57 67.2
Ireland 2.4 20.1 6.9 21.8 88.6
Italy  2.1 13.2 4.8 15.3 −0.64 67.9
Latvia 0.5 10.3 3.9 11.3 −0.89 52.9
Lithuania 0.4 9.1 3.0 12.3 −0.90 39.7
Luxembourg 1.7 25.4 7.1 18.8 52.8
Malta 0.7 17 4.5 17.5 −1.89 76.1
Netherlands 5.5 15.2 4.4 16.2 0.12 64.4
Poland 0.5 9.7 4.8 19.3 −1.15 45.3
Portugal 0.6 9 4.2 14.7 −0.25 55.4
Romania 0.2 6.5 5.6 16 −1.57 48.7
Slovakia 0.5 10.1 5.4 19.2 −1.61 73.5
Slovenia 3.2 14.1 4.7 15.3 0.08 63.7
Spain 1.7 11.9 4.5 15.9 −0.57 57.4
Sweden 10.1 17.6 5.3 18.9 1.20 80.1
United Kingdom 3.3 17.8 6.6 18.6 −0.15 79.7
Source: Vértesy and Tarantola (2014) and authors’ own calculations. Note: no data for Croatia, Ireland and Luxembourg in the sector-adjusted R&D intensity; export data for
very  small countries such as Luxembourg, Malta or Cyprus to be interpreted with caution.
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pecialised in knowledge-intensive industries as well as at the top
f the quality ladders within those activities.
Fig. 3 compares the SU indicator, built as a linear average of
he export quality indicator and the sector-adjusted R&D expen-
itures, with the linear average of the four components of the EU
020 Innovation Indicator. The left panel of Fig. 3 shows differences
n ranks resulting from their values, as the ranks are often the most
mportant policy information triggering further analysis.18 Coun-
ries with a negative score on Fig. 3 have a lower ranking according
o the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator than according to the SU indi-
ator.
The comparison between the SU indicator and the EU 2020 Inno-
ation Indicator reveals that several countries outlined above as
howing relatively high specialisation in knowledge-intensive sec-
ors, without necessarily being at the frontier in these activities,
erform worse in the upgrading indicator in terms of losing several
anks (e.g., Hungary, Czech Republic, but also Luxembourg, which
roﬁts from large ﬁnancial services). Among the “winning” coun-
ries are several which tend to focus on less knowledge-intensive
ectors, but are at a higher position on the rungs of the quality
adder (e.g., Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Austria). Some countries
o equally well on both dimensions of innovation outcomes (e.g.,
weden, France, Denmark).
This brief analysis supports the view that an indicator set that
gnores elements of structural upgrading consistently understates
imensions of innovative performance that are more pertinent in
ountries focusing on sectors with less knowledge intensity, and
verrates innovation outcomes of less-knowledge intensive activ-
ties within knowledge-intensive sectors. We  next evaluate the
trength of the bias resulting from the omission of the structural
pgrading component. To this end we construct a modiﬁed EU 2020
ndicator, which is calculated as the arithmetic average of the four
ndicators of the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator19 and the two indi-
ators of the SU indicator. As the modiﬁed indicator contains more
change” than “upgrading” components, structural change receives
igher weight. Although the literature surveyed in section 2 would
ctually support a higher weight for upgrading than used in the
odiﬁed indicator, this point requires further research. We  com-
are the results for the ranking according to the EU 2020 Innovation
ndicator and the modiﬁed EU 2020 indicator in the right panel
f Fig. 3. Again, countries with a negative score on Fig. 3 have a
ower ranking according to the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator than
ccording to the modiﬁed EU 2020 indicator.
The results of the ranking conﬁrm that primarily countries spe-
ialised in knowledge-intensive sectors which are further away
rom the frontier perform worse under the modiﬁed indicator.
xamples include Hungary (rank 14 instead of 10), the Czech
epublic (15 instead of 13) and Slovakia (16 instead of 15). Coun-
ries with large ﬁnancial sectors but few other innovation outcomes
the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator implies that the size of ﬁnan-
ial services contributes to innovation outcomes) lose as well (e.g.,
uxemburg ranks 8 instead of 3). Among the countries that would
ain under the modiﬁed version of the EU 2020 indicator are coun-
ries specialised in less knowledge-intensive sectors and focusing
n high quality, such as Italy (17 instead of 19) and Portugal (22
nstead of 24). Some countries that already did well in the EU 2020
nnovation Indicator even improve their position when structural
pgrading is taken into account (e.g., Finland, Sweden, Denmark)
hile some countries which were already low ranking in the EU
18 Note that due to the different weighting, the ranks for some countries are slightly
ifferent than in Table 1 for the EU 2020 indicator, but the direction of change is
naffected.
19 This procedure deviates from the one used by the EU Commission which assigns
ifferent weights to each component (COMP: 0.43, PCT: 0.23, KIA: 0.18, DYN: 0.15).licy 46 (2017) 30–42
2020 Innovation Indicator also stay at the bottom in the modiﬁed
version (e.g., Latvia and Lithuania).
Our analyses should be understood as a ﬁrst attempt at shed-
ding more light on the process of structural upgrading, with clear
room for further improvement. Data are not available for all coun-
tries; unit values are not always related to product quality; and
clearly, additional indicators are needed to cover further upgrading
dimensions, such as quality in services (exports). In spite of these
limitations, in terms of the range of innovation outcomes covered
in both manufacturing and services, it adds upgrading dimensions
to the EU indicator and is hence relevant for a much larger part of
the EU economies (e.g., the knowledge-intensive activities in the
KIA indicator make up between 10 and 20% of most EU economies),
while our outcome indicators cover potentially the whole market
economy (sector-adjusted R&D intensity) and all of manufacturing
(export quality).
In summary, we  ﬁnd that neglecting structural upgrading
penalises countries that are close to the frontier in less knowledge-
intensive sectors. By contrast, countries which boast large ﬁnancial
sectors or which are part of international value chains in
knowledge-intensive sectors but at the least knowledge-intensive
part of the chain (e.g., assembly) obtain higher rankings. Finally,
countries that perform equally well (or equally poorly) on both
dimensions are least affected by the omission of structural upgrad-
ing indicators.
4. Conclusions
European research and innovation policy over the past decade
focused considerably on increasing inputs to innovation. In 2002
the Barcelona goal was  announced, aimed at bringing R&D expen-
diture in the EU to 3 percent of GDP by 2010. When this target was
not reached, 2020 was  set as the new target year. In order to eval-
uate the efﬁciency of increasing inputs, a thorough understanding
and monitoring of the outputs and outcomes to be achieved by
these inputs is needed. We  showed that the new EU 2020 Inno-
vation Indicator does make an attempt in this direction, but falls
short in terms of measuring innovation outputs and in terms of the
dimensions of innovation outcomes it captures.
Measuring innovation outputs and outcomes for the purpose
of indicator-based country comparisons is difﬁcult. The EU 2020
Innovation Indicator mainly focuses on innovation outcomes and
includes little information on the quantity or quality of innovation
output. It only uses patents, which we have argued are difﬁcult
to use as an innovation output indicator because they conceptu-
ally do not need to imply actual innovations. In that respect the
patent indicator used in the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator should
be considered as measuring the “throughputs”, but not the outputs
of innovation, contrary to the title of the communication by the
European Commission (2013).
Throughputs are conceptually closer to the capability to cre-
ate new knowledge, rather than to translate this knowledge into
commercially successful products, or to derive economic beneﬁts
from this new knowledge. However, if one is interested in these
economic beneﬁts of innovation, which is the declared aim of the
EC as stated in its communication (2013), then information on the
quantity and quality of innovation throughput and output (e.g.,
how many innovations introduced, how path-breaking they are
from a technological perspective) matters less than information on
innovation outcomes, i.e. the economic impacts of innovations.
In this paper, we argue that to adequately measure innovation
outcomes at the country level, both structural change (reallocating
economic activity towards more knowledge-intensive sectors) and
structural upgrading (getting closer to the frontier in sectors coun-
tries are already specialised in) should be considered. The latter
J. Janger et al. / Research Policy 46 (2017) 30–42 39
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tFig. 3. Change in ranks: SU indicator vs EU 2020 Innovation Indicator (left p
s certainly a major innovation outcome and reﬂects an impor-
ant trend in competitive strategy. In order to defend competitive
dvantage against low-cost competitors pushing from below, coun-
ries attempt to climb up the quality ladder and move to more
nnovation-based activities within a given sector. At the same time,
tructural upgrading mirrors the increased path dependency of
echnological progress due to more complex knowledge bases. So
ar, the structural upgrading dimension has been widely neglected
n innovation outcome indicators and is barely integrated in inno-
ation performance rankings.
This is also true for the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator as three
ut of the four components primarily focus on structural change as
n innovation outcome; the patent indicator reinforces this focus
n knowledge-intensive sectors. This is somewhat surprising given
he priority of EU policy on smart specialisation, which acknowl-
dges the merits of strengthening industries that have comparative
dvantages regardless of being high-tech or low-tech, knowledge-
ntensive or capital-intensive. The EU 2020 Innovation Indicator
ystematically favours countries specialised in industries classiﬁed
s more knowledge-intensive, even if the actual activities per-
ormed within the country are not that knowledge intensive. At the
ame time, it neglects important innovation outcomes in terms of
pgrading, thereby underrating countries that are specialised and
lose to the frontier in less knowledge-intensive sectors.
For policy makers, the EU 2020 Innovation Indicator will be of
ittle additional value as it does not address sufﬁciently well the
uestions that are typically posed to a policy-oriented innovation
ndicator: How successful is my  country in terms of innovation out-
uts and in particular eventual outcomes? Does my  country invest
nough given its speciﬁc situation? How well do inputs eventually
ranslate into outcomes? In fact, the indicator may  even mislead
olicy makers and discourage from further investment. If higher
nvestment in R&D and innovation is not mirrored in better out-
ome measures, innovation policy makers will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
rgue for higher budgets, particularly in a situation of tight gov-
rnment budgets and calls for cuts in government expenditure. A
roper and comprehensive measurement of innovation outcomes
s hence critical for demonstrating the importance of higher invest-
ent into the generation and exploitation of new knowledge.
We  believe that measuring innovation outcome in a comprehen-
ive way based on indicators requires a more balanced approach
han the one chosen by the European Commission. Our article modiﬁed EU 2020 indicator vs. EU 2020 Innovation Indicator (right panel).
can in itself be seen as a response to the call of the High Level
Panel on Innovation Measurement (2013, p. 24) for a “substan-
tial research effort on conceptual foundations” as well as empirics
of innovation measurement, which it could not provide due to
the limited time available for its report. We  propose a conceptual
framework that stresses the differences between structural change
and structural upgrading as two important dimensions of innova-
tion outcomes and show that results can differ quite substantially
for some countries if structural upgrading is taken into account. In
times of globalisation of innovation systems and fragmented value
chains, it is not enough to look at between-sector variation only.
We need to take into account the actual innovation outcomes and
look at within-sector variation as well, and consider the positions
countries assume in different segments of the quality ladder. Gen-
eral knowledge intensity of sectors (calculated as an international
average) needs to be combined with variations in the actual knowl-
edge intensity within sectors. Such an approach covers the entire
business sectors and not just a narrow subset of pre-deﬁned sectors.
In policy terms, our framework opens up a potentially fruitful
agenda for further research, as drivers of structural change can now
be compared to drivers of “upgrading”. Depending on their starting
position, countries may  strive for higher shares of knowledge-
intensive sectors and/or move towards more knowledge-intensive
activities across all sectors. E.g., countries at the top of the quality
ladder in less knowledge-intensive sectors may  prioritise efforts
to diversify into new areas of strength, using tools such as foster-
ing spin-offs from academic research. By contrast, countries further
away from the frontier in knowledge-intensive sectors may aim to
upgrade through an increase in the innovation intensity of existing
ﬁrms, e.g. through R&D subsidy programmes or increased coop-
eration of ﬁrms with universities. There is a clear case for further
empirical research on how science, technology and innovation poli-
cies inﬂuence the two  dimensions of innovation outcomes.
In terms of innovation outcome measurement, more work
is clearly needed to improve indicators. The upgrading compo-
nent of outcomes needs to be covered by additional indicators,
showing complementary dimensions. A major step forward would
be to measure the actual innovativeness of fast growing ﬁrms
and their contribution to employment in all sectors, rather than
just measuring the employment share of fast growing ﬁrms in
knowledge-intensive sectors. This would also better illustrate
upgrading in services. While our sector-adjusted R&D measure cov-
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rs manufacturing and services, our measure of export quality is
estricted to manufacturing. With regard to indicators on structural
hange, while both manufacturing and services are included, dif-
erent industry classiﬁcations at the international level complicate
omparisons (as also pointed out by the High Level Panel on the
easurement of Innovation, 2013), calling for better harmonised
ndustry classiﬁcations. Determining the relative importance of
upgrading” and “change” for improving a country’s innovation
erformance would be helpful, too. This can also inspire the further
nvestigation of the relationships between outputs and outcomes
o inform policies about their effectiveness.
While we have not contributed to improving output measure-
ent, we have outlined that the subjective approach has difﬁculties
eveloping internationally comparable measures of innovation
utput, while the objective approach is too cumbersome and
atents have well known limitations. At the same time, existing
tatistical tools to measure innovation outputs have to be advanced
ith a view on better international and inter-sectoral comparabil-
ty. This is particularly true for innovation surveys of the cis-type
hich theoretically should serve research and policy with data on
nnovation outputs, but so far have largely failed to deliver. There
s hence a clear need for further research on appropriate indicators
or outputs and outcomes. Based on a new conceptual framework,
e hope that our article will provide a new impetus for research
n innovation output and outcome measurement which will even-
ually contribute to reducing uncertainty in policymaking.
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able A1
ull range of normalised values for indicators used in Section 3.
PCT KIA COMP DYN Sectorally
adjusted R&D
intensity
EU28 EU 0.37 0.39 0.68 0.63 0.53 
Belgium BE 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.66 
Bulgaria BG 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.47 0.35 
Czech Republic CZ 0.06 0.32 0.63 0.70 0.25 
Denmark DK 0.62 0.48 0.77 0.69 0.82 
Germany DE 0.73 0.49 0.94 0.74 0.57 
Estonia EE 0.21 0.23 0.44 0.32 0.68 
Ireland IE 0.22 0.72 0.96 1.00 
Greece EL 0.02 0.31 0.30 0.52 0.44 
Spain ES 0.15 0.29 0.38 0.44 0.40 
France FR 0.39 0.41 0.63 0.90 0.70 
Italy  IT 0.19 0.35 0.44 0.38 0.38 
Cyprus CY 0.01 0.55 0.38 0.51 0.41 
Latvia LV 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.30 
Lithuania LT 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.30 
Luxembourg LU 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.71 
Hungary HU 0.13 0.32 0.60 0.74 0.10 
Malta MT 0.05 0.56 0.36 0.59 0.00 
Netherlands NL 0.52 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.61 
Austria AT 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.72 
Poland PL 0.03 0.17 0.43 0.76 0.22 
Portugal PT 0.05 0.13 0.28 0.32 0.50 
Romania RO 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.45 0.10 
Slovenia SI 0.29 0.40 0.41 0.38 0.60 
Slovakia SK 0.03 0.19 0.58 0.75 0.08 
Finland FI 1.00 0.48 0.45 0.55 1.00 
Sweden SE 0.96 0.59 0.57 0.72 0.93 
United Kingdom UK 0.31 0.60 0.89 0.70 0.53 
Croatia HR 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.35 0.37 licy 46 (2017) 30–42
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Table A1
Calculation of sector-adjusted R&D intensity
Direct comparisons of R&D expenditures relative to GDP  are
ﬂawed as especially the business R&D expenditures (BERD) are
heavily inﬂuenced by the industrial structure of each country.
Smith and Sandven (1998) have therefore proposed a decomposi-
tion that identiﬁes country and sector effects in BERD and therefore
permits to compare R&D intensities in the business sector across
countries. The starting point for their decomposition is the obser-
vation that
IM,j =
RDM,j
VAM,j
= RD1,j
VAM,j
+ . . . + RDn,j
VAM,j
=
(
RD1,j
VA1,j
VA1,j
VAM,j
)
+. . . +
(
RDn,j
VAn,j
VAn,j
VAM,j
)
→
IM,j =
n∑
i=1
Ii,jwi,j, (1)
where RDM,j and VAM,j are the aggregate R&D expenditures of the
business sector M in country j, and the index i = 1,.,n indexes the sin-
gle industries i. Variables Ii,j and wi,j are then the industry speciﬁc
R&D intensities and the weight of the sector in aggregate business
sector output VAM,j .
Simple expansions of the above expression yield
n nIM,j,t =
i=1
I¯i,twi,j,t +
i=1
Ii,j − I¯i wi,j,t (2)
and
Export quality EU 2020 modiﬁed SU-Indicator EU 2020-indicator
0.68 0.55 0.38 0.52
0.59 0.50 0.41 0.44
0.09 0.19 0.06 0.17
0.50 0.41 0.19 0.43
0.77 0.69 0.55 0.64
0.91 0.73 0.61 0.73
0.35 0.37 0.22 0.30
1.00 0.78 0.47 0.72
0.00 0.27 0.16 0.29
0.38 0.34 0.22 0.31
0.81 0.64 0.40 0.59
0.59 0.39 0.27 0.34
0.63 0.42 0.28 0.36
0.29 0.17 0.12 0.11
0.03 0.10 0.08 0.06
0.29 0.63 0.57 0.71
0.57 0.41 0.22 0.45
0.75 0.38 0.31 0.39
0.52 0.49 0.49 0.45
0.74 0.57 0.46 0.49
0.14 0.29 0.10 0.35
0.34 0.27 0.09 0.20
0.21 0.23 0.00 0.27
0.50 0.43 0.35 0.37
0.70 0.39 0.11 0.39
0.64 0.69 0.74 0.62
0.83 0.77 0.77 0.71
0.82 0.64 0.45 0.62
0.32 0.21 0.13 0.19
rch Po
w
i
g
a
r
t
b
e
s
e
a
i
t
d
(
e
i
E
t
s
p
c
b
h
f
A
I
i
v
c
t
t
t
a
C
u
m
1
p
f
s
r
a
t
c
D
l
4J. Janger et al. / Resea
IM,j,t =
n∑
i=1
I¯iwi,j,t +
n∑
i=1
(
Ii,j,t − I¯i,t
)
w¯i,t
+
n∑
i=1
(
Ii,j,t − I¯i,t
)
(wi,j,t − w¯i,t) (3)
here I¯i, t and w¯i,t are the averages of the R&D intensity in industry
 and the contribution to value added of industry i to the aggre-
ate output of the business sector respectively. Averages for I¯i,t
nd w¯i,t are taken over a group of benchmark countries.20 The ﬁrst
ight hand side component of Eq. (2) presents the industry struc-
ure effect in aggregate BERD. It presents the intensity of aggregate
usiness R&D if all business sectors would invest into R&D at levels
qualing the cross country average of the benchmark countries. The
econd right hand side component of Eq. (2) captures the country
ffect on BERD. It is the weighted sum of the sector speciﬁc devi-
tions of industry speciﬁc R&D intensities from the cross country
ndustry speciﬁc average R&D intensity. Eq. (3) instead decomposes
he second right hand side (RHS) term of Eq. (2) further into an effect
ue to the change of R&D intensity in the industries of a country
second RHS term in Eq. (3)) and an interaction effect combining the
ffect of differences in industrial structure and the effect of change
n R&D intensity across industries in a country (third RHS term in
q. (3)).
This decomposition allows for a comparison of R&D expendi-
ures across countries by separating structural effects from country
peciﬁc effects. Controlling for industry structure it is therefore
ossible to compare whether in the aggregate the industries in a
ountry perform better or worse in comparison to the group of
enchmark countries.
In order to carry out this comparison data from different sources
ave been consolidated into one data set. The principal data sources
or this analysis are taken from the OECD’s databases STAN and
NBERD as well as Eurostat’s BERD and Value Added databases.
n assembling the database for the decomposition analysis several
ssues had to be dealt with. The principal problems were missing
alues either for the value added or the BERD data, inconsisten-
ies in the classiﬁcation of industries across countries and/or over
ime leading in some cases discontinuities, gaps and anomalies in
he data. In particular, while the decomposition is mainly based on
he NACE (Rev. 2) 2-digits level, some of the industries had to be
ggregated.21
alculation of the export quality indicator
The calculation of the export quality indicator is based on export
nit values in manufacturing which are used to deﬁne price seg-
ents within each 6-digit NACE (Rev. 2) sector (see also Aiginger,
997; for a discussion of the relationship between unit values and
roduct quality). Manufacturing exports data for 2012 are taken
rom the Eurostat Comext database. 27 individual EU member
tates with the exception of Croatia are covered, for each of them all
eported bilateral exports values and quantities are used. For Malta
nd Luxemburg a smaller set of unit values was available, therefore
he result for these countries should be interpreted with caution.
Bilateral export unit values in 6-digit NACE (Rev. 2) sector j are
alculated as the ratio of values of exports P*Q from country k to
20 The following countries have been selected as benchmark countries: AT, BE, DE,
K,  FI, FR, NL, NO, SE, UK, US.
21 The following sector aggregates have been used (if deviating from the 2-digits
evel): 01–03, 05–09, 10–12, 10–33, 13–15, 31–32, 35–36, 37–39, 41–43, 45–47,
9–53, 55–56, 59–60, 62–63, 64–66, 69–75 (excl. 72), 77–82, 87–88, 90–93, 94–99.licy 46 (2017) 30–42 41
country s (expressed in D ) to quantities M of the same exports
(in kg), whenever both information on export values as well as
quantities is available and when they are above a certain threshold
(10,000D for values and 2 tons for quantities).
UVk−s,j =
Pk−s,j ∗ Qk−s,j
Mk−s,j
Afterwards for each 6-digit NACE level sector j, the 33.3 and 66.7
percentiles P of the distribution of all bilateral export unit values of
the 27 individual EU member states covered are deﬁned as cut-off
points or boundaries B for three price segments (high, medium or
low) as a proxy for quality segments.
Bj,low = P33.3UV1−27,j
Bj,high = P66.7UV1−27,j
The boundaries are identical for all countries at the 6-digit level.
These boundaries are then used to classify each bilateral export
value at the 6-digit level into one of the three price segments S, for
example all unit values below the 33.3 percentile threshold form
therefore the low price segment category S across all countries
UVk−s,j ∈ Sj,lowifUVk−s,j < Bj,low
In the end, the corresponding exports’ values P*Q are summed
up for each country k to different aggregation levels (total country
exports – all sectors N – as well as groups of sectors) for each price
segment category. The resulting aggregated export values for the
low, medium and high price segment are than expressed as the
respective share in total exports E of the analysed country k, for the
example of the low price segment:
Ek,Slow =
⎛
⎝ N∑
j=1
(Pj ∗ Qj)∀(UVj < Bj,low)
⎞
⎠/ N∑
j=1
(Pj ∗ Qj)
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